喻园管理论坛2019年第8期(总第459期)
演讲主题: Feedback Stackelberg Games for Dynamic Supply Chains with Cost Learning
主 讲 人: Suresh P. Sethi, 德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校教授
主 持 人: 杨彦武教授,工商管理系
活动时间: 2019年3月18日（周一）上午9:30-11:00
活动地点: 学院219室
主讲人简介: Suresh P. Sethi是德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Charles & Nancy Davidson运营管理教授、智能供应网络中心主任、加拿大皇家科学院院士。他目前担任Production and Operations Management期刊（UT Dallas 24种顶级期刊之一）的Department Editor，Springer Briefs in Operations Management资深主编，Journal on Risk and Decision Analysis、Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering、Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization副主编，International Journal of Production Research、International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Productivity Management编委会成员，Baltic Journal of Real Estate Economics and Construction Management国际编辑会成员；曾担任Production and Operations Management协会主席，Manufacturing and Service Operations Management和Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal 资深主编，Operations Research、Automatica、Journal of Mathematical Analysis & Applications等副主编。Sethi教授的研究涉猎广泛，在运作管理、金融与经济、营销、优化理论等领域均做出了杰出贡献。他撰写有7本著作，并在制造和运营管理、金融和经济、市场营销和优化理论领域发表了400多篇研究论文，其中在UTD顶级期刊Management Science、Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management中发表论文总数达56篇。
活动简介: We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price dependent demand. The manufacturer’s second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two-period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer’s production decisions, and on the retailer’s procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. In particular, when the manufacturer may hold inventory, we identify two major drivers for inventory carryover: market growth and learning rate variability. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results by examining a model in which cost learning takes place continuously.
